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LandCyber Operations: A Double Edged Sword or a Dream Team?
Perhaps it is best to see the Internet and cyber attack as the latest in a long line of technologies that have changed warfare and provided new military capabilities.
-James Andrew Lewis 1 The US Army Cyber Command's strategy for LandCyber operations provides a window from which one might peer into the future and see a network centric force that has harnessed technology and information to achieve advantage in the land and cyberspace domains by establishing unity of command. While on one hand, the LandCyber strategy is a good start in terms of conceptualizing how the Army will operate in an increasingly networked manner, on the other hand, one might be concerned that the Army's reliance on a network will make it more vulnerable to an attack through cyberspace. Protecting the network, however, will be a core competency of future cyber forces and demonstrates commitment to mitigating that risk. As Army units operate at the end of a long tether in an increasingly complex and distributed land and cyber environment, the Army's network will provide opportunities for incredible access to information gathered from both the land and cyber domains which will then be shared vertically and horizontally. This is where both opportunity and vulnerability lie.
Will the Army use LandCyber delivered enhanced situational awareness and access to information to improve its capability to Prevent, Shape and Win the nation's wars, or will it allow technology to be the wet blanket of mission command? Will LandCyber be a double-edged sword that is ultimately self defeating, or a dream team of complementary capabilities? The land and cyberspace domains are inseparable and the Army must embrace the LandCyber strategy as an approach for operating in the current and future operating environment.
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The Department of Defense (DoD) 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace states that "cyberspace is a defining feature of modern life" in which billions of people "connect, socialize, and organize themselves." 2 Ever increasing access to and reliance upon information delivered through cyberspace has elevated cyberspace's recognition to that of a domain of military operations. The 2010 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review justified the designation by stating that cyberspace is "now as relevant a domain for DoD activities as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air and space." The US Army's LandCyber White Paper 2013-2020 takes it a step further in describing the cyberspace domain as "terrain" for the information environment. 3 Even a cursory study of the relative short history of cyberspace, specifically the internet, very clearly illustrates its vulnerability to attack, hacking, criminal activity, espionage and cyber war.
Cyberspace is a truly contested domain. But in spite of the obvious risk, reliance on cyberspace for information continues to grow for both the US Army and the world. The US Army must be able to protect itself and exploit advantages in the cyberspace domain.
Land, perhaps a more tangible and familiar domain of military operations, is also a contested domain. US interests will continue to be threatened across the globe.
Competition for natural resources, clashes of culture and religion, grasps for political power, economic tension and overpopulation are but a few of the underlying conditions that will foment conflict in the 21st century. History has not proven an effective road map for determining the location of the next conflict but it has shown its likelihood.
America's Army must remain ready to win decisively and dominate the land domain.
If thoroughly grasped by commanders, LandCyber has great potential for units to achieve effects in the cyberspace domain that will contribute directly to decisive effects in the land domain. The unified effects will enable commanders to attacks less tangible centers of gravity, such as political will, through the cyberspace domain. Cross domain effects will complement and support each other to achieve far more decisive effects in the operational environment. Area. 13 The mission control area includes necessary actions to operate and defend the network. These include passive and active measures, such as cyber network hunting and incident response. The force enhancement area includes the functions that provide for situational awareness and knowledge while the support mission area refers to the operations that support the LandWarNet. The force application mission area includes exploit, attack and influence operations. Understanding the Army's cyberspace potential in operational terms is essential to grasping the LandCyber strategy.
While LandCyber is dependent on the Army's future network (LandWarNet), the LandCyber strategy must be broad enough to convince commanders that considering the cyberspace domain and taking advantage of cyber capabilities is not just about more computers and "cyber attack." With the possible exception of the Army's most specialized formations, computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation (CNE) are competencies which are not currently resident in Army general 7 purpose forces and focusing on those two capabilities will only serve to frustrate and mislead commanders. In fact, the authorities for these operations are complicated and contain interagency legal issues that are out of bounds for Army units who do not possess the skill sets or equipment. ARCBYER is developing a process and capability that would serve as a "call for fire," of sorts, to request effects by, with, or through the cyberspace domain. 14 The Army must provide clarity to the LandCyber strategy by presenting it as a concept that will deliver and maintain situational awareness, to an extent not previously experienced, which will enable decisive maneuver and effective information operations to assist commanders in achieving their mission.
LandWarNet
Army units at every level need reliable access to information technology that helps sift through the data to gain knowledge through the cyberspace environment, enabling decisive maneuver and an ability to conduct influence operations, in a more efficient and timely manner. LandCyber operations enabled by LandWarNet and brought to life through the mission command warfighting function will provide unprecedented access to information and the technology and staff functions that will lead to gaining knowledge.
The Army Posture Statement for 2012 states "The Army network must be dynamic to give Soldiers, civilian and partners information and services when and where needed." The embodiment of that vision will be LandWarNet. LandWarNet is the US Army's effort to create the "enterprise-level network that will enable warfighters and leaders around the world to achieve information superiority. In fact, the Army will begin to field 8 LandWarNet integrated capability sets to brigades beginning in 2013. 19 These sets will introduce emerging network technology improvements to the operational force "in stride." Tactical and operational use by mainstream units will provide feedback to the LandWarNet community for continued improvements. Through unit testing and the NIE, the Army will be able to refine the network architecture to create an "end to end" solution for warfighters with a data strategy for Army wide common products and services. Mobile devices made "user 9 friendly" by Apps 4 the Army (A4A) will ensure the network is available to users in need -the warfighter at the tactical edge. 20 LandWarNet contributes directly to the LandCyber concept through the mission command warfighting function. LandWarNet's overarching purpose is to "deliver a deployable network enabled mission command capability" as the "cornerstone of the Army's expeditionary force capability." 21 This is absolutely critical to the LandCyber concept which relies entirely upon increased access to the network. As the warfighting function responsible for integration, the mission command warfighting function will provide the framework for integrating Cyber capability in support of ULO. The LandCyber strategy should be a guiding principle for commanders, similar to combined arms, and mission command. The Army doesn't "do combined arms" but we operate in a combined arms fashion. The Army does not "do mission command" yet seeks to operate in a mission command fashion. The Army will never "do LandCyber"
operations yet LandCyber will enable combined arms, mission command and create opportunities for the Army to compete in the battle for ideas.
Influencing People
The Army Cyberspace Force Application framework outlines three capabilities that deliver effects to commanders on the battlefield -Exploit, Attack, and Influence. would not target an adversary's strength but rather the focal point where that strength is distributed, where that strength gains power. 27 Building on that position, if an idea is the unifying theme that supports conflict then information might be defined as the idea's strength and so the focal point, the point of distribution, might be the internet or cyberspace. To place this in the context of the Global War on Terrorism, which undeniably is a contest of ideas -religious extremism centered on hatred of the west is the motivating idea. Information from various antagonistic sources can provide the idea's strength but the means by which the information is distributed and the place where it gathers strength, the focal point, often lies in the infinite reaches of cyberspace.
Contrary to popular sentiment, this center of gravity for ideas is not necessarily the place where one strikes for victory but rather it is the place where one must compete, and if centers of gravity exist at multiple levels of war then LandCyber offers commanders at all levels new capabilities to identify capabilities and exploit vulnerabilities.
Globalization's tsunami effect on the information environment shows very clearly the requirement for the Army to compete in the cyberspace domain. 28 In order to do so, Intelligence Brigade has been activated as "the BCT of cyber" with the mission of defending military networks and potentially addressing the "cyber call for fire" requirement. 35 Many units will complete their training cycles with challenging rotations at one of the Army's three training centers. The training centers will feature a "World Class Cyber Opposing Force" from the 1st Information Operations Command to create a realistic multi domain training environment. 36 This initiative will challenge units, generally BCTs, as they create and defend networks. If able to defend their network, these BCTs will enable mission command, achieve shared situational understanding and compete in the informational environment. Through the NIE/Agile Process, the Army will deliver materiel solutions that will enhance command post capability with respect to communications, analysis, and situational awareness. A powerful example of anticipated capabilities involves common social network analysis and social media analysis programs on common hardware working off "the cloud" where the "network is the computer." 37 Through the cyber domain, land force CEM, intelligence, targeting, and operations personnel will be manned, equipped, and trained to understand human behavior of particular groups. The full complement of LandCyber possibilities will be tested against an adversary in the land and cyberspace domains. Between the purpose built 780th MI Brigade and the enhanced BCTs, the Army will demonstrate a remarkable capability -a force that is ready for deployment and prepared to dominate in the land and cyberspace domains.
Shape
Shaping the international environment involves activities to "assure our friends and contain our enemies." 38 The regionally aligned force concept is designed to provide a wide range of Army capabilities to Combatant Commanders in support of theater security objectives. 39 The Army Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7 described the concept as domains and a real plan for IIA operations, lower level units will be able to operate in a permissive information environment based on the local conditions they encounter. 46 Current conflict has demonstrated reluctance to allow initiative inspired IIA operations at lower levels because of the threat of information fratricide. 47 The CEM cells will be able to advise the commander on actions to take in the cyber electromagnetic spectrum with respect to protecting his network and shutting down the adversary's information access. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been testing tablet computers with transformative smart phone applications in Afghanistan which are delivering mapping, networking and individual identification capabilities at the platoon 21 level conducting combat operations. 48 Mainstream delivery of this type of device as part of the LandWarNet A4A program will significantly increase the situational awareness of the airborne assault force while providing the same level of information to the follow on force -simultaneously. Approaching LandCyber strategy and embracing cyber capabilities organized to deliver effects by, with and through the cyberspace domain, in a combined arms manner, will clearly make the Army more effective along the prevent, shape, win mission construct.
Concerns
While the scenarios provided in the previous section illustrate the possibilities offered by LandCyber, the Army cannot afford to fall victim to the attractive siren of technology and ignore the possible risks. Cyber enabled information in the form of a common operational picture, network diagram, or on-line profile, regardless of their level of detail, have never adequately described reality and usually beg for more information. 49 Situations will exist in which platoon leaders, brigade commanders and division commanders will have the same common operational picture yet different ideas of what actions should be taken. In the future as in the present, some commanders will practice mission command by empowering and enabling subordinates with intent while others will micro-manage subordinate commanders with specific instructions and overbearing supervision. But in a network enabled force, micro-managing commanders will be able to cast a wider net and potentially paralyze an entire organization. If LandCyber cuts twice as a double edged sword, it will surely strike a fatal blow to mission command.
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However, if LandCyber is a dream team, the future of mission command has never been brighter. Commanders are not the only cause of mission command failure;
often it is the inexperienced subordinate who lacks the intuitive ability to see opportunities even in the best of mission command circumstances. With common situational awareness and reliable voice and data communications, a more experienced commander can act as a coach in the ear of a platoon leader to guide him in the right direction while remaining within the spirit of mission command. With the recent emergence of "machine learning" that offers applications for analyzing human behavior and decision making, language translation and pattern recognition, it is not much of a stretch to imagine a platoon leader with a "learning machine" on his forearm which can make recommendations for action based on months of input data and shared situational awareness. 50 That kind of capability would surely meet the goal of LandCyber -"to ensure mission command in the conduct of unified land operations." The right kind of leader with the right kind of technology -that is a dream team.
Conclusion
"A century ago, armies discovered that technology could be the key to victory.
Since then there has been a steady stream of new weapons, new technologies, and new ways to attack." 51 This monograph proposed that unified land and cyberspace operations as an operating concept is the next step in the evolution of combined arms and the continued effort to harness technology. The Army's operating concept of Prevent, Shape, and Win is well supported by the LandCyber operations approach at all levels in order to achieve strategic effects. A more full examination of cyber operating functions through each element of the Prevent, Shape, Win construct will help 23 commanders to understand how the "LandCyber approach" will enable them to orchestrate complementary effects in both domains. LandCyber implementation should parallel LandWarNet. Each deliverable from the LandWarNet program that improves the Army's network capability ought to be accompanied by an incremental increase in commander effectiveness in achieving cross domain synergy. Further development of the cyber attack "calls for fire" to higher level cyber units will allow the Army to realize that potential when it becomes available. Given the emphasis by the Army's most senior leaders on mission command, almost to the point of promising that type of leadership environment to junior leaders, the Army cannot allow LandCyber to renege on that promise. Further study must examine the impact of LandCyber operations on mission command. As for the Army's LandCyber strategy, it's a good place to start.
